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Government has played an important role in assuring the integrity of the food supply for centuries.1 Although
originally an eort to control fraud in the marketplace, regulation evolved to protect against unsafe food,2 and
eventually to assure the nutritional integrity of food.3 Because the rst drugs were food products, regulating food
and drugs together made sense. In the United States, the rst comprehensive federal legislation regulating food and
drugs, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,4 focused on the purity and quality of products and the accuracy of
their branding.5 While the 1906 Act did contribute to the safeguarding of the public's health, the Act had several
limitations,6 and eventually demand for a new regulatory system mounted.7 Congress strengthened legal control
over the ecacy and safety of drugs with the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act).8
Under the FD&C Act, FDA has broad authority to regulate and has enjoyed immense regulatory power.9 Most of
the Act's operative provisions describe circumstances under which a food, drug, or cosmetic would be subject to FDA
enforcement action because of adulteration or misbranding.10
1See Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food Supply, 4 Annual Review of Nutrition
1 (1984), in FOOD & DRUG LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, eds., 1991), at
1.
2See id.
3See id.
4Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
5See Steven R. Salbu, O-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of
Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 181, 183, citing ch. 3915, xx 1-12, 34 Stat. at
768-72. See also FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 4, 9.
6See 1917 Report of the USDA Bureau of Chemistry, in FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 10-11. Limitations
included the lack of (1) legal standards for food, (2) authority to inspect warehouses, and (3) any restriction on the
use of poisons in drugs. See id.
7See id. at 11.
8See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 183, citing Pub. L. No. 52-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codied as
amended at 21 U.S.C. xx 301-392 (1997)).
9See Anne Marie Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better": The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 and the First Amendment, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 603, 616.
10See FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 12.
1The FD&C Act has been amended over one hundred times since 1938,11 at times expanding and other times
constricting FDA authority. For example, the rigor of external control was expanded with the passage of
the Drug Amendments of 196212 and the Medical Device Amendments in 1976.13 One author notes that,
over a period of less than sixty years, the pharmaceuticals market was transformed to a closely regulated
environment.14 Nevertheless, FDA has also been subject to enactments curtailing its power, most notably in
the 1980s and 1990s. This movement away from the trend of escalating administrative authority matched the
deregulatory atmosphere of the Reagan administration and was a response to activists' demands for expedited
marketing of new HIV and AIDS treatments.15 Early AIDS-era reforms included the development of the use
of investigational new drugs for treatment, fast-track approvals, and parallel-track investigational drugs.16
In addition, Congress further deregulated the already loosely governed market for dietary supplements by
passing the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).17 More recently, regulatory
and legislative changes have focused on the area of pharmaceutical marketing. FDA has initiated changes
that have broadened the ways in which drug manufacturers advertise pharmaceutical products directly to
consumers.18 Consequently, many of the components of this era of change have increased consumer access to
drugs and related products, and expanded freedom in the manufacture and marketing of those products.19
In 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), amending the
11See Summary of FDAMA, Covington & Burling, at 5.
12See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 183, citing Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codied as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. xx 301-381 (1997)). The Drug Amendments transformed a system of
premarket notication into one that requires individual premarket approval of the safety and eectiveness of every
new drug, thereby fundamentally restructuring the way in which FDA regulated new medicines. See FOOD & DRUG
LAW, supra note 1, at 13.
13See FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 13. The Amendments transformed FDA's approach to regulation of
medical devices and substantially enlarged the array of regulatory tools available to the Agency. See id.
14See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 183.
15See id. at 193, citing Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 267, 361 (1998) (associating the Reagan administration with an era of deregulation) and Phillip J.
Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, New York Times, Sept. 24, 1989, at E5 (noting the
connection between AIDS activism and FDA reforms).
16See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 184.
17See id.
18See id. (citations omitted).
19See id. at 183, citing Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny
in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1999).
2FD&C Act and the biological products provisions in section 351 of the Public Health and Service Act.20
Viewed as a whole, the FDAMA represents a substantial change in the existing law.21 While the law
is comprehensive, some provisions specically relate to manufacturers' ability to promote o-label uses of
approved products. In 1999, three cases signaled a major change in the way FDA can regulate, arming the
theme of increased consumer access to information and increased freedom in the marketing of products and
services regulated by FDA. In these cases, courts found various FDA Guidance Documents,22 sections of
FDAMA, and FDA's implementation of the law to be in contravention of the First Amendment freedom of
speech. Relying on the commercial speech doctrine, courts held in favor of a more liberalized approach to the
dissemination of information with respect to o-label use, services for compounded drugs, and health claims
for dietary supplements. This paper seeks (1) to provide the background necessary to understand current
commercial speech jurisprudence; (2) to explore the First Amendment analysis in recent cases against FDA;
(3) to examine the landscape of food and drug law and FDA's regulation with respect to the promotion of
prescription drugs and medical devices; and (4) to discuss the viability of other FDA policies on o-label
promotion. In light of the recent decisions and the expansion of ways to provide information to consumers,
the paper argues in favor of increased consumer access to information and the expansion of manufacturers'
ability to provide information, within certain parameters.
20See Summary of FDAMA, supra note 11, at 1.
21See id. at 9.
22x 701(h)(1)(A) of FDAMA requires FDA to develop guidance documents with public participation
and ensure that such written documents are publicly available. Although the guidance documents do
not create or confer any rights for or on any person, they do represent the views of FDA on matters
under its jurisdiction. See Summary of FDAMA, supra note 11, at 91-92.
3I. First Amendment Background
A.
Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court has never held that all forms of communication are constitutionally protected.23 Traditionally,
most kinds of \commercial speech" were viewed as being an unprotected category, outside the scope of the First
Amendment.24 It was not until 1976 that the Court formally abandoned the traditional rule and held that even
\purely commercial" speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.25 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Consumer Council, the Court struck down Virginia's ban on advertising prescription drug prices as
a violation of the First Amendment.26 Importantly, the Court concluded that the First Amendment forbids the
State from deciding that ignorance is preferable to the free ow of information.27 The Court rejected Virginia's
contention that drug price advertising could trigger distorted perceptions and misguided conduct, noting that the
First Amendment did not countenance \this highly paternalistic approach."28 Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that, although commercial speech is entitled to protection, the protection might be less extensive than for other
23The First Amendment does not cover certain utterances, such as obscenity, defamation, and
``fighting words.'' See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (obscenity); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defamation); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(``fighting words'').
24See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The traditional view was that \purely commercial advertising"
was not entitled to any First Amendment Protection, and could therefore be subjected to governmental regulation in
the same way as any other type of business activity. See id.
25See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (hereinafter \Virginia
Pharmacy"). See Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better," supra note 9, at 616 or 619?. See also
Edmund Polubinski III, Closing the Channels of Communication: A First Amendment Analysis of the FDA's Policy
on Manufacturer Promotion of \O-Label" Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 181, footnote 114.
26See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (year). See also Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of
Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 59 (1999).
27See id.
28Id. at 769-770. See also Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at
60-61.
4types of speech.29 The Court noted two attributes of commercial speech justifying greater regulation that would be
acceptable for other forms of expression. First, the relative objectivity of commercial speech supports an expectation
that commercial speakers can verify the truth of their message.30 Second, the \hardiness" of commercial speech,
based on the dependence of prots on advertising, decreases the worry that commercial speech will be hampered by
regulation promoting truthful commercial information.31
The anti-paternalistic theme emerged again as a major factor in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, where the Court
ruled that a state bar could not prohibit an attorney's advertising the price of routine legal services.32 The State
argued that advertising of legal services is inevitably misleading because of the incomplete information provided by the
advertising.33 The Supreme Court again expressed its skepticism of justications for suppressing truthful information
\based on the benets of public ignorance."34 Although in the next term, the Court sustained a state's bar on the
ability of attorneys to solicit clients in person,35 the Court did not repudiate the \anti-paternalistic heart of Virginia
Pharmacy."36 In trying to dene the limits of the protection for commercial speech, the Court attempted to articulate
a \common sense" distinction between permissible and non-permissible restrictions on commercial speech.37 One
author argues that the Court was not trying to create a non-regulable category of speech, but rather was attempting
to illustrate the more limited nature of protection oered to commercial speech.38 The Supreme Court's current
approach recognizes an intermediate category meriting its own analysis.39
29Note that false or misleading advertising could be prohibited. Similarly, broader regulation of
``time, place, and manner'' might be justified, and the strong presumption against prior restraints
might not apply.
30See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 61, discussing Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
31See Id., discussing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
32See 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
33See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 62, discussing Bates,
433 U.S. at 375. Because potential clients will not know which specic services they need, their decision-making
capacity is diminished. See id.
34Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
35See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
36Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 63.
37Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1014, citing Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 455-56, quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
38See id. at 1015.
39See id. at 1010.
5In 1980, the Court promulgated a formal four-part test to determine whether a given regulation of commercial speech
violates the First Amendment:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amend-
ment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.40
Applying the four-part test, the Court struck down a state's blanket ban on advertising by an electric utility
to promote the use of electricity. 41 Under the Central Hudson standard, the rst question asks whether
the targeted speech is constitutionally protected.42 The Court held in Central Hudson that commercial
speech receives protection only to the extent that it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,43 where
misleading speech is \communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it."44 In more recent
cases, the Court has claried that this portion of the test covers only \inherently misleading" speech,45
subjecting speech that is only \potentially misleading" to the balancing inquiry of the remainder of the
Central Hudson test.46 To evaluate whether speech is \inherently misleading," courts will consider whether
the speech is more likely to deceive the public than inform it,47 whether there are substantial \possibilities
for deception,"48 and whether experience has shown that such advertising is subject to abuse.49
The second inquiry evaluates the government's interest in restricting the speech: is the restriction reasonably
41See id. at 571.
42See id. at 566.
43See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1025.
44Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
45In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). Because inherently misleading speech carries substantial
social harms, and the state obviously has a compelling interest in preventing such harms, speech
that is inherently misleading may be regulated on that basis alone. See id.
46See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1025, citing Peel v. Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) quoting In re RMJ, 455 U.S. at 203.
47See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
48Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
49See In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191.
6related to a substantial governmental interest?50 On several occasions, the Supreme Court has held that a
government's \interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens...provide[s] a suciently
`substantial' governmental interest to justify regulation."51 In addition, the Court has noted that the gov-
ernment's interest in \ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial."52
Consequently, the government often asserts as its substantial interests public safety and health and protec-
tion from economic adulteration.
The third factor asks whether the regulation at issue directly advances the government interest asserted.53
More specically, such a regulation \may not be sustained if it provides only ineective or remote support for
the government's purpose."54 The Court has picked up the anti-paternalistic theme from Virginia Pharmacy
and Bates here. In a more recent decision, the Court again noted that a paternalistic motive will not suce:
\A State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information
unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it."55
Finally, the Court will evaluate the t between the government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends. In Central Hudson, this was a \not more extensive than is necessary" test.56 Post-Central
Hudson cases watered down this requirement. In Fox, the Court refused to invalidate a university's rule
prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating in campus facilities as a per se violation, reformulating
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson standard.57 The Court explained that the Central Hudson test does
not impose a \least restrictive means" requirement, but only mandates a \reasonable" t \that represents
50See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
51Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485(1995) citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
52Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
53See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
54Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The government must ``demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.'' Edenfield,
507 U.S. at 770-771.
5544 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (Stevens, J. writing the plurality
opinion). ``The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to
keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.'' Id. at 503.
56Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
57See Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
7not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served."58
Although the 1980s witnessed a less stringent standard of scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech,59
the 1990s proved to be an era of relative invigoration of the commercial speech doctrine.60 The biggest change
in the commercial speech doctrine landscape occurred with the Supreme Court's analysis in 44 Liquormart
v. Rhode Island.61 In the wake of the case, a statute or regulation appears to face a greater burden the more
the state aims its restrictions at noncommercial aspects of commercial speech.62 The Court addressed a
challenge by licensed liquor retailers to a Rhode Island statute prohibiting advertising of alcohol price infor-
mation.63 The Court unanimously agreed that the statute violated the First Amendment, although the case
produced a web of concurrences. Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Stevens condemned the \wholesale
suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information"64 and rejected the proposition that commercial speech
in areas of heavy regulation enjoys no First Amendment protection. Justice Thomas went even further,
calling for the abolition of the Central Hudson test and substitution of per se invalidity in the case of such
paternalistic restrictions.65 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor, writing for four justices, found Rhode
Island's t unreasonable under a more cautious reading of Central Hudson than the vigorous version ad-
vanced by Justice Stevens.66 The decision heralded a more protective attitude toward commercial speech67:
no special category of unprotected commercial speech exists for labeling and other communications and one
author comments that, read together, the opinions of Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas suggest that
58Id. at 480. The regulation in question does not have to be the \absolute least restrictive means to achieve the
desired end." Id. at 476-477. See also Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 762 (the means must advance the objective in a \direct
and material way.")
59See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 64.
60See id. at 69.
61See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1015.
62See id. at 1019.
63See 517 U.S. at 489-492.
64Id. at 505 (Stevens, concurring). See also Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech,
supra note 26, at 72.
65See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 72, discussing 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518, 526-528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 72.
67See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 72.
8the Court would consider restrictions on a manufacturer's communications more critically under the Central
Hudson test than it would other restrictions on commercial speech because of the signicant informational
character of such communications.68
B. Dening Commercial Speech
Author Nat Stern notes that, although no rules exist for dening the contours of the commercial speech
category, certain themes and decisions have been suciently denite to form a discernible picture of what
expression the Supreme Court is likely to regard as commercial speech.69 In determining whether to in-
voke the limited protection aorded \commercial speech," the earliest cases addressing the issue focused on
whether the speech at issue did \no more than propose a commercial transaction."70 This sort of speech
appears to bear what the Court regarded as the hallmarks of commercial speech: objectivity and hardi-
ness.71 While continuing to arm simple proposals of commercial transactions as falling within the \core
notion of commercial speech," the Court has also suggested that the category encompasses a larger sphere
of expression.72 In Friedman, the Court treated trade names as commercial speech because the expression
could reasonably be linked to a proposal to buy or sell.73 In Central Hudson, the Court declared a distinction
between fully protected "direct comments on public issues" and statements \made only in the context of
commercial transactions."74
The Court's approach to expression containing a mixture of commercial and non-commercial elements was
rened in two major decisions addressing the problem of classication: Bolger v. Young's Drug Products
68See id. at 1022.
69See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 79. See also Murphy,
\It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better," supra note 9. The Supreme Court has not agreed on precisely how
\commercial speech" should be dened, addressing in depth the denition of commercial speech in only one case. See
id.
70Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762, quoting Pittsburgh Press Company v. Human Relations
Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). See also Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication,
supra note 25, at 1016.
71See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 79.
72See id. at 80.
73See id. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11.
74Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
9Corporation and Fox.75 In Bolger, the Supreme Court addressed for the rst time whether the speech at issue
was \pure speech," entitled to full protection of the First Amendment, or \commercial speech," entitled to
only more limited protection.76 At issue were yers and informational pamphlets that described the benets
and availability of condoms. Because the pamphlets contained discussions of important public issues as well
as descriptions of condoms manufactured by Youngs, the Court conceded that the pamphlets transcended
simple proposals of commercial transactions.77 Consequently, the Court cited three factors that inuenced
its decision that the communication at issue was commercial speech: (1) the speech was concededly an ad-
vertisement; (2) the speech referred to a specic product; and (3) the speaker had an economic motivation
for disseminating the speech.78 Noting that none of the factors is determinative, the Court has made clear
that the existence of an underlying prot motive does not by itself operate to remove full First Amendment
protection.79 The Bolger Court noted that a company has the option of addressing public issues directly
if it wants full First Amendment protection.80 In Fox, the Supreme Court adopted a similar focus, noting
that the non-commercial portion of the hybrid speech could be expressed elsewhere.81 At issue were banned
\Tupperware parties," which consisted of a sales pitch and discussion of topics such as nancial and domestic
responsibility.82 The Court observed that the admittedly non-commercial component of the expression was
not essential to the central purpose of the presentations.83 Consequently, the Court reviewed the university's
75See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 81.
76See Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better," supra note 9, at |. The Supreme Court has not agreed
on precisely how \commercial speech" should be dened, addressing in depth the denition of commercial speech in
only one case. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). The material was sent out by the
manufacturer in the form of a mass mailing to the public. The U.S. Postal Service notied the manufacturer that
the mailing violated a federal law and the manufacturer brought the case seeking a declaratory judgment. The Court
ruled that a statute which prohibited the mailing of advertisements for contraceptives violated the manufacturer's First
Amendment commercial speech rights. See id. at 61, 67.
77See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66, 68.
78See id. at 66-67.
79See id. The Court noted that none of these factors is either necessary or sucient for a determination of whether
the speech at issue is commercial speech. See id. See also Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra
note 25, at 1016, citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 482; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
80See Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Denition of Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 82.
81See id.
82See id.
83See id.
10regulations under the standard for commercial speech.84 Thus, regulatory and legislative provisions chal-
lenged under the commercial speech doctrine will face a reinvigorated analysis under the traditional Central
Hudson standard.
84See id.
11II. Three Landmark Cases
A. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney: Challenge to FDA's Policy Regarding Certain O-Label Promotion by Drug Manufacturers
1. Background on O-Label Promotion Through Enduring Ma-
terials and CME Seminars
Traditionally, under the FD&C Act, a manufacturer could not promote a product for any use other than
the ones for which the company received FDA approval. Before a manufacturer can lawfully market a
prescription drug, FDA must approve the product for both safety and ecacy.85 Alternative uses for
approved drugs, or o-label uses, are subjected to the same FDA review procedures as the initial claim.86
Consequently, in 1992, FDA published a \Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientic and
Educational Activities."87 The notice explains that FDA has traditionally viewed scientic and educational
activities sponsored by the companies that market the products involved as \labeling," but the draft guideline
claries that FDA does not wish to regulate these activities if they are truly independent from manufacturer
inuence and are non-promotional.88 On October 8, 1996, FDA published two additional draft guidance
documents, \Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data" and
\Guidance for Industry-Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts." FDA essentially limited manufacturers
to dissemination of peer-reviewed journal articles that discuss those adequate and well-controlled clinical
trials that were relied upon by FDA in approving the product for the intended use. Similarly, FDA allowed
dissemination of medical texts by manufacturers, even where the texts discussed o-label use if the texts were
prepared independently of the manufacturer's interests, did not focus primarily on any particular product,
85See 21 U.S.C. x 355(a)-(b) (1994); 21 C.F.R. xx 314.50, 314.100 (1996).
86See 21 U.S.C. x 321(p). In 1962, Congress amended the denition of \new drug" to make clear that drugs
must be demonstrated safe and eective for \use under the conditions prescribed," meaning that all uses for a drug
must obtain FDA approval. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998)
(hereinafter \WLF I").
8757 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992).
88Id. See also Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better," supra note 9, at 605.
12and did not focus primarily on an o-label use. In addition, the text must not have been written, edited,
or signicantly inuenced by the product manufacturer. Although FDA received comments from various
groups contesting the constitutionality of these policies,89 FDA published the Final Guidance Documents
with the same basic guidelines.90 In addressing the comments received, FDA rmly restated its conviction
that a very broad denition of \labeling" brings industry-supported scientic and educational activities that
involve the sponsoring company's product well within FDA jurisdiction.91
Despite the limitations on a manufacturer's ability to promote unapproved uses, o-label use is an important part
of medical practice.92 Doctors and researchers discover new uses for drugs which are not described in the product's
labeling, meaning that the uses dier from those tested and approved by FDA. FDA does not attempt to regulate
the prescription of products for unapproved uses.93
2. WLF Court Finds Guidance Documents Unconstitutional
In 1994, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) brought a lawsuit challenging the Guidance Documents
discussed above,94 seeking to enjoin FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing
policies restricting certain forms of manufacturer promotion of o-label uses for FDA-approved drugs and
89WLF provided feedback to FDA in response to the agency's request for comments, noting its First
Amendment freedom of speech concerns with certain policies.
90See Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data (61 Fed. Reg. 52,800
(Oct. 1996)); Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts (61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 1996));
and Final Guidance on Industry Supported Scientic and Educational Activities (62 Fed. Reg. 64,074)(FDA set forth
twelve factors that would be considered in determining whether the activity is independent from the inuence of the
manufacturer).
91See Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better," supra note 9, at 605, citing 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,075.
Consequently, the nal versions of the Guidance Documents were basically the same as the Draft Documents.
92Off-label use is very common across medical specialties and may constitute the best treatment
for many patients in varied circumstances. Forty-four of 36 approved anti-cancer drugs are used
for at least one off-label indication. See Sarah F. Jagger, Director of Health Services Quality
and Public Issues, GAO, Statement before the Sept. 1996 House Hearing (Sept. 12, 1996); 1996 WL
10830746, at *3.
93See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 992. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 59820,
59821 (1994) (noting that the agency has restated this policy on numerous occasions).
94WLF specifically challenged the policies discussed in note 91.
13devices.95 The threshold question for the court is how to classify the speech at issue. FDA argues that
the speech regulated by the Guidance Documents falls outside the ambit of the First Amendment because
of the federal government's extensive power to regulate the pharmaceutical industry.96 The court notes
that this argument does not comport with current First Amendment jurisprudence, and that the speech is
aorded some type of constitutional protection.97 WLF argues that the speech was scientic and academic
speech, entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection. FDA argues, on the other hand,
that the Guidance Documents were incidental encroachments upon speech and entirely compatible with the
First Amendment. In the alternative, FDA claims that the Guidance policies at most regulate commercial
speech.98
In analyzing whether the speech at issue is \pure speech" or \commercial speech," the court notes that the resolution
of the question is not an easy one because the communications present one of those \complex mixtures of commercial
and non-commercial elements."99 The application of the three Bolger factors directs the conclusion that both
types of communication are properly classied as commercial speech.100 Typical commercial speech is uttered
directly by the commercial entity that wishes to nancially benet from the message. Here, however, the speech
manufacturers wish to communicate is the speech of others. WLF argues that, although the manufacturer may have
an economic motivation, that is insucient, without more, to transform enduring materials and Continuing Medical
95See WLF I, 13 F.Supp. at 54.
96See id. at 60.
97See id. at 60, discussing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at { (rejecting the concept that, because the government has
the power to regulate extensively in a certain area, the government also has the authority to regulate speech without
raising First Amendment concerns).
98See id. at 59.
99Id. at 62, quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J. concurring).
100See note 79 and accompanying text. The WLF court also relies on an analogy to Bolger to bolster
its conclusion. Among the informational pamphlets that Youngs Drug Products Company wished to mail
included one entitled ``Plain Talk About Venereal Disease,'' which discussed condom use without any
specific reference to the varieties manufactured by the company. The court still concluded that
the pamphlet constituted commercial speech. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. The court notes that in
the instant case, although one could argue that the reprints and seminars are merely informational,
because the information is in fact supplied by the manufacturer, and because the primary purpose is
to encourage the purchase of the featured product, the speech is commercial speech. See id.
14Education (CME) seminars into commercial speech.101 The court determines that the drug manufacturers endeavor
to disseminate enduring materials and sponsor CME seminars in order to increase the sales volume of their drugs
and that therefore the speech is commercial in nature.102
After determining that the communication involved is commercial speech, the court uses the Central Hudson
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the Guidance Documents. Notably, the Court rejects FDA's
position that all unapproved speech is inherently misleading:
In asserting that any and all scientic claims about the safety, eectiveness, contraindications,
side eects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are preemptively untruthful or misleading
until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the
universe.103
Deciding that the Guidance Documents address speech that is directed toward lawful activity and that is
not misleading, the court concludes that the rst prong of the test is satised.104 The court next addresses
the second inquiry: whether the interest asserted by the government is substantial. The court rejects the
rst asserted interest, that of ensuring that physicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that
they can make informed prescription decisions, as overly paternalistic.105 The court notes that physicians
are capable of critically evaluating journal articles or textbook reprints or the ndings presented at CME
seminars.106 However, the court nds that the government's interest in providing manufacturers with ample
incentive to get previously unapproved uses approved to be substantial.107
101See id. at 62, relying on Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
102See id. at 64. One author has argued that the speech in the enduring materials (peer-reviewed journal articles
and reference texts) should be classied pure speech rather than commercial speech. See Murphy, \It's Time to Make a
Good Agency Better," supra note 9, at 621. Using the Bolger analysis, she argues that (1) enduring materials are not
necessarily advertisements; (2) enduring materials do not always mention the \product name"; and most important,
(3) plaintis who invoke their right to receive the enduring materials may have no economic motivation at all. See
id.
104See id. at 69.
105See id. See also notes 28 & 55 and accompanying text.
106See id. at 70.
107See id. at 69. FDA focused on the harm that may come to patients if o-label uses become prevalent before
adequate and well-controlled clinical trials are conducted by manufacturers and assessed by FDA. See id. at 71. WLF
15Requiring manufacturers to submit supplemental applications to obtain approval for new uses directly ad-
vances the substantial government interest.108 However, the Guidance Documents fail to meet the fourth
factor and are therefore unconstitutional. The restrictions are more extensive than necessary to encourage
manufacturers to get new uses on-label.109 The District Court therefore holds that WLF is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law110 and issues an injunction.111 The Court notes that FDA may still sanction
the dissemination of any material that is false or misleading.112 Moreover, FDA can require pharmaceutical
manufacturers to disclose an interest in drugs or devices and the fact that the use discussed has not been
approved by FDA.113
3. WLF Court Reevaluates First Amendment Doctrine After the
Enactment of FDAMA
Following the enactment of FDAMA, the District Court denied FDA's motion to conne the application of
the injunction to the express provisions of the Guidance Documents, and proceeded to evaluate whether the
changes in FDA policy eected by FDAMA brought FDA into compliance with the First Amendment.114
For the rst time in recent years, drug manufacturers were permitted by statute to engage in the o-label
focused on the harm that may come to patients, especially in the eld of orthopedics and oncology, if the information
does not reach the health care provider. See id. at 72. See also Murphy, \It's Time to Make a Good Agency Better,"
supra note 9, at 609.
108See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 71.
109See id. at 73. The court notes that the determination was based in large part because a less-burdensome alter-
native exists: full and complete disclosure. See id.
110See id. at 62, 65, 73. See also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination
of Information on O-label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Modernization Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645,
649 (1999).
111The Court held that the FDA shall not in any way prohibit, restrict, sanction or otherwise seek
to limit any pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer or any other person from: disseminating
peer-reviewed articles, regardless of its proposing off-label uses and regardless of whether the
articles mentions the original FDA-approved study; disseminating reference textbooks published by
a bona fide independent publisher regardless of whether it proposes off-label uses; and suggesting
content/speakers at a symposium regardless of off-label promotion. See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 73.
See also Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 36 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (hereinafter ``WLF
II'') (redline amended order granting summary judgment and permanent injunction.
112See WLF II, 36 F.Supp.2d at 419.
113See id.
114See Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 56 F.Supp.2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999) (hereinafter \WLF III").
16marketing and promotion of drugs and devices, subject to a variety of legislative constraints.115
The court holds that FDAMA unconstitutionally restricted protected commercial speech.116 As with the
Guidance Documents, the Court applies the four-factor Central Hudson test. The court again concludes
that the speech is neither unlawful nor inherently misleading.117 Similarly, the Court nds that FDA does
have a substantial interest|that of encouraging manufacturers to seek FDA approval of o-label uses.118
However, the Court determines that only one of the policies contained in the provisions of FDAMA at issue
directly advances that substantial government interest|the supplemental application.119 Nevertheless, the
Court nds that the supplemental application requirement was unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy
the means-ends test. The application burdens substantially more speech than necessary.120 Consequently,
the court amends the injunction to enjoin the FDAMA provisions at issue.121 Thus, the decision in WLF
provided FDA with its rst direct warning that over-regulation of commercial speech could infringe on those
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.122
115See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 212. Section 401 of FDAMA adds a new subchapter D to the FD&C
Act, consisting of new sections 551-557, authorizing manufacturers to disseminate information on unapproved uses
of approved drugs, biological products, and devices. The provisions represent a compromise; they allow distribution,
but only if the manufacturer complies with a number of restrictions. Section 551 permits a manufacturer to dis-
tribute written information concerning an o-label use if, inter alia, the information is not derived from research
conducted by another manufacturer, without its permission; the manufacturer submits the information to FDA sixty
days before beginning distribution, together with safety and eectiveness information from clinical trials and safety
information from reports of clinical experience; and the manufacturer includes a prominent statement that the use
has not been approved, a copy of the approved labeling, and disclosures relating to authorship and funding. Under x
552, manufacturers may only disseminate information in the form of (1) an unabridged peer-review article published
on a scientic or medical journal about a \scientically sound" clinical investigation; or (2) a reference publication
containing similar information. To qualify, the reference publication must not have been prepared at the manufac-
turer's request, signicantly inuenced or distributed solely by the manufacturer, focus on a particular drug or device,
or present materials that are false or misleading. Finally, in order to disseminate such information, x 554 requires
a manufacturer to submit to FDA a supplemental application covering the new use, certify that it will submit such a
supplement, or seek an exemption within six months of the initial dissemination of information under x 551.
116See WLF III, 56 F.Supp.2d at 82. The court held that 21 U.S.C. xx 360aaa-360aaa-6 was unconstitutional insofar
as it was inconsistent with the injunctive provision. See id at 88.
117See id. at 85.
118See id. at 86.
119See id. at 86-87.
120See id. at 87.
121See id at 87-88. Note that FDA appealed the District Court's conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that
the appeal would be dismissed for lack of constitutional controversy, where FDA took the position on appeal that
FDAMA did not provide it with independent authority to proscribe speech and WLF responded that it no longer had a
constitutional objection to FDAMA or FDA. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (hereinafter \WLF IV").
122See Steven B. Steinborn and Kyra A. Todd, The End of Paternalism: A New Approach to Food Labeling, 54
17B. Pearson v. Shalala: Challenge to FDA's Policy on Health Claims for Dietary Supplements
1.
Background on Health Claims
For over fty years, FDA has vigorously regulated nutritional claims by dietary supplements under both the
food and drug provisions of the FD&C Act.123 FDA established detailed labeling requirements for foods
marketed for \special dietary uses" shortly after the enactment of the 1938 Act.124 After FDA concluded
that it needed stricter requirements to control the claims made for vitamin-mineral products, the Agency
published new regulations in 1966.125 The new regulations were immediately challenged, leading eventually
to a court decision that in 1974 invalidated and remanded to the Agency for further consideration several
portions of the rules.126 In 1976, Congress intervened, amending the FD&C Act to limit FDA's regulatory
authority and enforcement power in relation to vitamin and mineral supplements.127 Consequently, FDA
was temporarily prevented from extensively regulating the composition of dietary supplements.
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 409 (1999).
123See FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 207. See also Melinda Ledden Sidak, Dietary Supplements and
Commercial Speech, 48 F00D & DRUG L.J. 441 (1993). FDA can regulate a food as a drug depending on the
nature of the claims made because FD&C Act denes drugs to include \articles intended for use in diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease and articles (other than food) intended to aect the structure of any
function of the body." 21 U.S.C. x 321(g) (FD&C Act x 201(g)). The \other than food" exception has been narrowly
construed by FDA. See Sidak, Dietary Supplements, at 441.
124See David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and its Substantive
Provisions, FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 212. For example, the original 1941 regulations for vitamin and
mineral supplements required that their labels declare the percent of the minimum daily requirement contained in each
recommended amount. See id. See also Sidak, Dietary Supplements, supra note 124, at 442.
125See Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 212; See also
Sidak, Dietary Supplements, supra note 124, at 442, discussing 31 Fed. Reg. 8521 (June 18, 1966).
126See Sidak, Dietary Supplements, supra note 124, at 442, discussing National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA,
504 F.2d 761 (2
nd Cir. 1974).
127See id. at 443, citing Pub.L. No. 94-278, x 501, 90 Stat. 401, 410-13 (1976). Section 411 prohibits FDA from
imposing maximum limits of vitamins and mineral potencies for other than safety reasons, classifying as a drug any
vitamin or mineral solely because it exceeds the potency limits recommended by FDA, and limiting the combination
or number of any safe vitamin, mineral, or other food ingredients in vitamin and mineral supplements. See FOOD
& DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 221. While constricting FDA authority with respect to regulating the composition
of dietary supplements, the 1976 law gave the agency limited authority to regulate the advertising of dietary foods.
This new authority was considered by some as compensation for the loss of FDA's authority over vitamin and mineral
supplements' composition. See id.
18Passage of the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), however, gave FDA the impetus to
renew its regulatory eorts.128 The NLEA creates an explicit exception to the general prohibition of drug-
like claims by authorizing FDA to pre-approve \health claims" that are supported by \signicant scientic
agreement."129 In 1994, the legitimacy of structure/function claims for foods was also enhanced by the
enactment of DSHEA.130 Nevertheless, FDA has had a restrictive implementation,131 and one author argues
that the NLEA has not fostered the broad dissemination of health claims or other diet and health information
that many groups had hoped.132
In order to assert health claims for conventional foods, the NLEA provides that products must obtain prior
FDA authorization.133 The Secretary will approve the claim only if she determines that there is \signicant
scientic agreement" among qualied experts that the claim is supported by the totality of publicly available
scientic evidence.134 Congress adopted a slightly dierent approach for evaluating health claims for dietary
supplements. Instead of mandating a particular standard, Congress delegated to FDA the task of developing
a procedure and standard for such health claims.135 FDA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register,
planning to adopt the same standard for dietary supplements that Congress had already adopted for foods
in conventional form. Although FDA received comments challenging the \signicant scientic agreement"
standard, the Agency adopted the standard in its nal rule.
2. District Court in Pearson Finds that Policies Withstand Con-
stitutional Scrutiny
128See Sidak, Dietary Supplements, supra note 124, at 443. The NLEA's purpose is to regulate more strictly the
kind of claims that can be made in food labeling, including dietary supplements. See id.
12921 U.S.C. x 343(r). See also Steinborn, The End of Paternalism, supra note 123, at 403.
130See Steinborn, The End of Paternalism, supra note 123, at 403. The net eect of the DSHEA and NLEA is that
structure/function claims are permissible. See id.
131See id. at 406.
132See id. at 408. \The restrictive approach of NLEA and FDA's cautious interpretation of its authority denied
consumers' access to widely available diet/health information on food labels." Id.
133See 21 U.S.C. x 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
134Id.
135See id.
19Manufacturers, distributors, and organizations of consumers of dietary supplements brought suit challenging
both the general rule issued by FDA for determining the validity of health claims for dietary supplements, as
well as four separate regulations addressing claims for specic disease-nutrient relationships, issued pursuant
to that general rule.136 Pearson and other dietary supplement manufacturers had requested unsuccessfully,
in part, that FDA approve the manufacturers' proposed claims with qualications that would reect the
shortcomings in the science found by FDA. 137 The District Court found that neither the \signicant scientic
agreement" standard for Dietary Supplements, nor the refusal to allow the health claims violates the First
Amendment.138
The court uses the four-part Central Hudson standard to reach its conclusion. The court begins its discussion
by dismissing the plaintis' contention that the \signicant scientic agreement" standard is overbroad
and a prior restraint on commercial speech.139 FDA argues that any health claim which cannot meet the
\signicant scientic agreement" standard is misleading to consumers, and in particular, as applied to the
four health claims at issue. The failure to meet the standard makes the claims misleading because they
136See Pearson v. Shalala, 14 F.Supp.2d 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1998) (hereinafter \Pearson I").
137See Pearson I, 14 F.Supp.2d at 14. See also Steinborn, The End of Paternalism, supra note 123, at 410. Plaintis
argued that dietary supplements should not be subject to the same procedure and standard as conventional foods.
Plaintis also objected to the FDA's proposed denial of the specic health claims they wanted to place on the labels of
dietary supplements. In particular, plaintis sought permission for the following health claims on dietary supplement
labels: (1) \Consumption of antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancers"; (2) \Consumption
of dietary ber may reduce the risk of colorectal cancer"; (3) \Consumption of omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the
risk of coronary heart disease"; (4)"The U.S. Public Health Service has estimated that fty percent of neural tube
defects may be averted annually if all women maintained an adequate intake of folate during childbearing years";
and (5) \.8 mg of folic acid in a dietary supplement is more eective in reducing the risk of neural tube defects
than a lower amount in food in common form." See Pearson I, 14 F.Supp.2d at 410. Note that the plaintis' claim
on folate and neural tube defects became moot on April 19, 1996, when FDA issued a Final Rule which eliminated
the restriction on the use of the Public Health Service Statement, provided that the statement was accompanied with
additional information noting that the claim is population-based. See 61 Fed.Reg. 8752, 8775-8776, 8781.
138See Pearson I, 14 F.Supp.2d at 17.
139See id. at 18. The court notes that the Supreme Court has held that the overbreadth analysis does not apply to
commercial speech. See id. discussing Fox, 492 U.S. at 481. The court also notes that there is no case law holding
that the prior restraint doctrine is applicable to commercial speech. See id. at 18.
20have not been scientically validated.140 The court agrees with this argument, holding that a statement
is inherently misleading when \the particular method by which the information is imparted to consumers
is inherently conducive to deception and coercion."141 The court notes that the public lacks the necessary
knowledge to evaluate the health claims when not subject to reliable verication through the consumer's
personal experience.142 Consequently, the court determines that FDA has satised the Central Hudson test
for both the \signicant scientic agreement" standard and the four rejected health claims.143
On the chance that a court could determine that the health claims language is only partially misleading, the
court evaluates the plaintis' claims under the remaining Central Hudson factors.144 The court nds that
the government has a substantial interest in protecting the health and safety of consumers.145 Moreover, it
determines that the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted in preventing consumer
fraud by unsupported health claims.146 Finally, the court nds that the regulation is no more extensive
than necessary to serve the government's interest.147 FDA's objective is to protect consumer health and
well being by preventing the dissemination of unsupported or insubstantial scientic information on dietary
supplement labeling. The regulation is suciently narrowly tailored by Congress to aect only the label itself
or materials directly attached to the label of the dietary supplement. As such, the regulation is no broader
than necessary to protect the public health and prevent consumer fraud.148 Finding that the defendant has
satised the Central Hudson test, the District Court dismisses the action for failure to state a claim.149
140See id. at 18.
141Id. at 18, quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 112.
142See id. at 18.
143See id. at 19.
144See id.
145See id.
146See id. at 20. The court refers to the inability of consumers to do research and analyze often conicting scientic
studies to determine whether a health claim is valid. See id.
147See id.
148See id. at 20.
149See id. The court also addressed the plaintis' non-First Amendment concerns. The court found that the \signif-
icant scientic agreement" standard for dietary supplements does not violate the Fifth Amendment for vagueness. See
id. at 21. The court also concluded that the \signicant scientic agreement" standard does not violate the NLEA,
or the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. at 14-17.
213. Appellate Court Determines that Policies are Unconstitu-
tional
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluds that the proposed health claims are not inherently misleading, unlike
the lower court, and that FDA is required under the commercial speech doctrine to consider whether inclusion
of appropriate disclaimers could negate the potentially misleading nature of health claims.150
As below, FDA attempts to preclude analysis under the commercial speech doctrine, arguing that manufac-
turers do not enjoy the First Amendment rights to free speech when FDA deems the \speech" in violation
of FD&C Act.151 The Court rejects FDA's argument, nding the contention \almost frivolous,"152 and
proceeds to analyze the restrictions under the Central Hudson standard.153 FDA argues that even if the
claims are only potentially misleading,154 under Central Hudson, the government is not obliged to consider
requiring disclaimers in lieu of an outright ban on all claims that lack \signicant scientic agreement."
155 The court disagrees, nding that disclaimers are constitutionally preferable to outright suppression of
150See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (hereinafter \Pearson II"). The court also disagreed
with the lower court's ruling under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), nding that FDA's failure to dene the
phrase \signicant scientic agreement" in regulation governing authorization of health claims violated the APA. See
id. The D.C. Circuit later rejects FDA's suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Pearson v. Shalala, 172 F.3d 72
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (hereinafter \Pearson III"). Judge Silberman, concurring in the denial of rehearing, noted that the
government cannot advance a major nonjurisdictional argument for the rst time at the rehearing stage. FDA argued
that neither employing a health claim as a trigger to the drug approval process nor subjecting \drugs" to the drug
approval process raises a First Amendment concern. This was an attempt at a \greater includes the lesser" argument.
See id.
151See Steinborn, The End of Paternalism, supra note 123, at 409, discussing 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526-27. As below,
the Agency contended that health claims lacking \signicant scientic agreement" are inherently misleading and thus
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 164 F.3d at |. \Inherently misleading advertising may be prohibited
entirely." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
152Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 105
(1990) (rejecting paternalistic assumption that the recipients of a letterhead are ``no more
discriminating than the audience for children's television).
153Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 655, discussing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68.
154``[T]he states may not place an absolute prohibition on...potentially misleading
information...if the information may also be presented in a way that is not deceptive.'' In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
155See Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 658. The court focused its analysis on whether it is permissible for FDA to prohibit
potentially misleading speech rather than allow speech with adequate qualications. See id.
22commercial speech.156
The court agrees with the analysis of the District Court, nding that FDA has asserted a substantial govern-
mental interest: the protection of public health157 and the prevention of consumer fraud.158 After evaluating
whether the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, however, the court determines
that the protection of public health is too paternalistic. Thus, only the prevention of consumer fraud stands
as a legitimate interest advanced by the regulatory scheme. As in WLF, FDA stumbled on the last factor of
the Central Hudson test: the court nds that the t between the government's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends is not \reasonable."159 The court holds that the preferred remedy is more disclosures
rather than less.160
The Court does not conclude, however, that all claims may be made truthful by the inclusion of a disclaimer;
instead it defers to FDA's determination of whether a claim is so misleading that it could not be rendered
nonmisleading by a disclaimer.161 Consequently, the message of Pearson is that FDA may not prohibit
commercial speech if there are less restrictive ways in which the message can be presented that ensure the
claim will not mislead consumers.162 FDA retains the legal authority to prohibit false or misleading labeling
claims, but Pearson now requires FDA to consider whether and how such information can be presented
to consumers in a way that informs without misleading.163 The net eect is intended to ensure that FDA
156See id. at 658.
157The government has a substantial interest in ``promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.'' Rubin, 514 U.S. 476.
158``There is no question that [the government's] interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial
information in the marketplace is substantial.'' Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761.
159See Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 657, citing Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (discussing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66). The
court found that FDA had failed to meet the fourth requirement of the Central Hudson test. See id. The Supreme
Court explained in Fox that the Central Hudson test does not impose a \least restrictive means" requirement, but only
mandates a \reasonable t" between means and ends. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
160See Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 658, discussing Bates, 433 U.S. at 376. Disclaimers are preferable to outright
suppression. See, e.g., Peel, 496 U.S. at 110; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206; Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,
486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988).
161See Steinborn, The End of Paternalism, supra note 123, at 411 discussing Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 659.
162See id.
163See id.
23adopt suciently exible policies that foster the broad dissemination of useful information to consumers.164
Thus, the importance of the case goes far beyond the facts of Pearson because FDA's approach in Pearson
is merely illustrative of FDA's view of its authority in the numerous contexts in which it is charged with
protecting consumers.165
C. Western States Medical Center v. Shalala: Challenge to FDA's Policy Forbidding Advertising of Compounded Drugs
1. Background on Compounded Drugs
As noted, the FD&C Act imposes stringent conditions on the manufacture and distribution of new drugs.166
All new drugs must comply with the requirements of the Act unless Congress has provided an explicit ex-
emption. Historically, while FDA has subjected new drugs to its requirements, it has permitted pharmacists
to compound drugs without meeting these stringent safety standards. Compounding is the process by which
a pharmacist combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication that serves the unique needs of
specic patients. Consequently, prior to the enactment of FDAMA in 1997, FDA had never exercised its
authority to subject compounded drugs to the FD&C Act's requirements. Nevertheless, FDA had expressed
concern about the manufacture of new drugs under the guise of compounding.167 In a Compliance Policy
Guidance, FDA set forth nine factors the Agency would use to determine whether a drug provider's eorts to
produce a particular drug justied FDA's exercise of enforcement action under the FD&C Act.168 In 1997,
Congress formally recognized this policy in FDAMA. Section 127 of FDAMA added a new x 503A to the
FD&C Act, permitting pharmacies to compound drugs under specied circumstances.169 Under subsection
164See id.
165See id.
166See 21 U.S.C. x 355(a).
167See Compliance Policy Guidance from 1992.
168See id.
169See 21 U.S.C. x 503A. The section provides that a drug product may be compounded without complying with the
requirement for GMPs, adequate directions for use, or NDA approval if it is compounded by a licensed pharmacist or
physician for an identied individual patient based on the unsolicited receipt of a valid prescription that a compounded
24(a), the drug product must be compounded \for an identied individual patient based on the unsolicited
receipt of a valid prescription order."170 Subsection (b) imposes numerous standards on the quality of the
ingredients of the compounded drug, requiring inter alia, that the drug product be compounded from a
list of approved drug substances that have not been deemed unsafe or inappropriate for compounding.171
Finally, under subsection (c), a drug may be compounded \only if the pharmacy, licensed pharmacist or
licensed physician does not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class or drug, or
type of drug."172
2. WSMC v. Shalala173
Pharmacists brought an action challenging subsections (a) and (c).174 Because the parties agree that the
speech implicated by these sections is limited to commercial speech, the court uses the Central Hudson stan-
dard to evaluate the limitations placed on the pharmacists' compounding services and ability to advertise
those services.175 The court concludes that the speech targeted by the restrictions at issue is not \inher-
ently misleading."176 The court notes that FDA has presented no evidence that the prohibited statements
contain false information and nds the unsupported assertion that the public will be misled into believing
by implication alone, that compounded drugs have passed FDA tests and been approved, insucient to
warrant the conclusion that the restricted speech is inherently misleading.177 Moreover, the court notes that
drug is necessary for the patient. See also Summary of FDAMA, supra note 11, at 44.
170
171
172
174Subsection (a) required that a prescription for the particular compounded drug be unsolicited
and that it be prepared for an identified patient and x(c) required that the drug may be compounded
only if the pharmacy does not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of
drug, or type of drug. See x 353(a) & (c) of FDAMA.
175See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1297.
176See id. at 1298-99.
177See id. The court points out a legitimate example of regulation where an advertisement was misleading. See
U.S. v. An Article...Acu-Dot, 483 F.Supp. 1311 (N.D. Ohio 1980). There, the defendants were manufacturers of a
\small, pin-head sized magnet attached to the underside of a circular, adhesive patch," which was designed to work as
a minor pain reliever. Defendants marketed the product as useful for temporary relief of occasional minor aches and
pains of muscles and joints. FDA brought suit against the defendants, claiming that the product had only a placebo
25the potentially misleading element can be reduced by the use of a narrower restriction, such as a disclaimer
on advertisements indicating that FDA approval has not been obtained.178 The court concludes, therefore,
that the speech at issue is not inherently misleading and may not be prohibited without reference to the
remaining Central Hudson factors.179
FDA posits three substantial interests: (1) the general goal of protecting the public health and safety180;
(2) the integrity of the drug approval process181; and (3) the interest in balancing the continued availability
of compounded drug products as a component of individualized drug therapy, while limiting the scope of
compounding so as to prevent manufacturing under the guise of compounding.182 While the court agrees
that the rst two asserted interests are substantial, it nds the third interest insuciently clear.183 The
court notes that it cannot agree with FDA that the government has a substantial interest in achieving some
amorphous and imprecise balance between the availability of compounded drugs and the prevention of dis-
guised manufacturing.184
The court next examines whether the provisions of FDAMA directly advance the two legitimate govern-
mental interests asserted. FDA argues that the speech-related restrictions limit the volume of compounded
eect, and therefore, the defendants' promotional statements about the product were misleading. The defendants did
not dispute that the drugs had only a placebo eect, but contended that the placebo eect was sucient to warrant
the defendants' claims regarding the drug's health benets. The court disagreed. On these facts, the court held that
the marketer's claim that the device itself provided temporary relief of minor aches and pains was false, and thus also
misleading. See id.
178See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1300, citing Peel, 496 U.S. 91. In Peel, the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission of Illinois brought disciplinary proceedings against the plainti under a rule prohibiting attorneys from
representing themselves to the public as specialists. See Peel, 496 U.S. 91. The plainti attorney had obtained a
\Certicate in Civil Trial Advocacy" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy and noted that on his letterhead. See
id. The Commission asserted that the plainti thereby implied to the public that he was a certied legal specialist.
See id. The Supreme Court explained that a state may prohibit inherently misleading speech entirely, but it cannot
impose an absolute prohibition if the information may be presented in a non-misleading manner. See id. The Court
recommended that as an alternative to a broad prohibition, the defendants could require a disclaimer to ensure that
complete information about attorneys' qualications was provided to the public. See id. It could not, however, broadly
proscribe truth information whose negligible misleading content could be remedied by providing more information. See
id. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772; Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, 953 F.Supp. 526, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
179See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1301.
180See id. at 1301.
181See id. at 1302.
182See id. at 1302.
183See id. at 1301-1302.
184See id. at 1303.
26drugs, thereby ostensibly protecting the public against purported health risks. The court nds that the
government fails to draw the necessary connection between the asserted interests and restricting the vol-
ume of compounded drugs, 185 referring to the Pearson decision.186 Moreover, the court notes that other
courts have considered and atly dismissed the government's argument, rejecting the \paternalistic" view
that suppression of truthful speech is necessary to protect physicians and consumers from their own misuse
of truthful information.187 The court also determines that x 353a of FDAMA does not directly advance the
asserted governmental interest of preserving the integrity of the FDA approval process,188 nding that, if
this were truly FDA's concern, the Agency could require that all drugs, including compounded drugs, obtain
prior FDA approval.189 Thus, the statute fails to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson standard.
The court notes that, even if it were to conclude that the statute could satisfy the \directly advance" re-
quirement, the statute is awed because it fails under the fourth factor.190
The court determines that the restriction is more extensive than necessary to achieve the asserted govern-
ment interest.191 The court again notes that FDA could rely on disclaimers, similar to the suggestion in
Pearson. Alternatively, the court reminds FDA that the Agency could subject compounded drugs to the
safety testing imposed on new drugs,192 rather than broadly prohibiting truthful speech.193
185See id. at 1304. See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (the court examines whether the regulation at issue
\directly advances the state interest involved"). Under this test, the regulation \may not be sustained if it provides
only ineective or remote support for the government's purpose." See id. Rather, to satisfy this requirement, \the
government must demonstrate that its restrictions will in fact alleviate [the asserted harms] to a material degree."
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 107 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9
th Cir. 1997), quoting Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 769. The
government must meet its burden in a direct and material way. See Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 767. The government body
must \demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." Id. at 770-771.
186See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1304.
187See, e.g., WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51; see also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. In Virginia Pharmacy, the
Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising their prices for prescription
drugs. See id. In reaching its conclusion, the court expressed its aversion to the use of suppression as a means to
prevent \uninformed" individuals from misusing accurate information. See id.
188See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1306.
189See id.
190See id. at 1307.
191See id. at 1307.
192See id. at 1308.
193See id. at 1309. The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment and grants the plaintis'
cross-motion for summary judgment, enjoining DFA from enforcing the speech-related restrictions contained in xx
27IV. Evaluation of Other FDA Policies Restricting O-Label Promotion
After the assault on FDA policies and federal law, which led to a declaration of the violation of manufac-
turers' First Amendment freedom of speech rights, FDA will face increased pressure from consumers and
manufacturers to expand access to information and the ability to promote unapproved uses of prescription
drugs and medical devices.
A.
Background
1. Labeling
The FD&C Act gives FDA jurisdiction over the labeling of prescription and non-prescription drugs and
restricted medical devices. The Act's denitions of \label" and \labeling" apply to drugs and devices
without dierentiation.194 The term \label" applies only to what is axed to the container that holds the
actual product.195 \Labeling," however, has a much broader denition.196 It is generally understood to
include any written material that supplements or explains the product, is disseminated by the manufacturer,
and reaches the customer, doctor, or patient either before, with, or after the product.197 As part of the
application for approval of a new drug or device, the manufacturer must submit the proposed nal labeling
353a(a) and (c). See id. at 1310.
194See FOOD & DRUG LAW, supra note 1, at 397.
195See 21 U.S.C. x 321(k) (\a display of written, printed, or graphic material upon the immediate container of any
article").
196See 21 U.S.C. x 321(m). \Labeling" includes \all labels and other written, printed or graphic" material on or
\accompanying" a product. Id.
197See Edward M. Basile, Ellen Armentrout, and Kelly N. Reeves, Medical Device Labeling and Advertising: An
Overview, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 519 (1999), discussing U.S. v. Urbeteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948) (holding
descriptive leaets constituted labeling even though the shipment of leaets did not accompany shipment of devices).
28for the product.198 In general, labeling must not be false or misleading in any particular,199 must provide
adequate directions for use,200 and must contain adequate warnings when the drug may be dangerous to
health if used in certain pathological conditions or in unsafe dosages or methods of duration of administration
or application.201 Labeling can be false or misleading even if not technically false or literally untrue.202 One
court expanded the denition of \misleading" to include instances when the total eect of the labeling is
to deceive or mislead.203 Consequently, manufacturers must present a \fair balance" of information relating
to side eects and the eectiveness of the product.204 In addition, any required labeling statements must
be placed on the label \with such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements, designs, or
devices in the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary
individual under customary conditions of purchase and use."205 FDA will approve the application only if the
labeling is acceptable and conforms precisely with the uses for which the Agency has found the product to
be eective.206 If the labeling of a drug includes unapproved indications, it will be deemed misbranded.207
FDA's general rule with regard to medical devices is, similarly, that medical device rms are not permitted
to promote devices if they are not approved or cleared. FDA \approves" pre-market approval applications,
but only \clears" 510(k) submissions. FDA's regulations prohibit the use of \approved" with respect to a
510(k) clearance because it implies that the clearance is a nding of the safety and eectiveness of the device,
198See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 995, discussing 21 U.S.C. x
355(b)(1)(F) and 21 C.F.R. x 314.50(e)(2)(ii).
199See id. at 54, FN 34.
200See 21 U.S.C. x 352(a). A drug or device is misbranded if the label is false or misleading. See id.
201See David W. Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet?, 53 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 47, 54 (1998), citing 21 U.S.C. x 352(f).
202See Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at 521.
203See U.S. v. One Device, More or Less, Ellis Micro-Dynameter, 224 F.Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
204See Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at 521.
205See Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate Prescription Drug Promotion, supra note 202, at 54, citing 21 U.S.C.
x 352(c).
206See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 995. See also 21 U.S.C. x 331(a) and
(d). FDA will approve the application only if the labeling is acceptable and conforms with the uses for which it has
found the product to be eective. See id.
207See Marilyn A. Moberg, James W. Wood, and Howard L. Dorfman, Surng the Net in Shallow Waters: Product
Liability Concerns and Advertising on the Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 215 (1998).
29whereas it is only a conclusion of \substantial equivalence."208 A device is approved for marketing based on
its \intended use," where \intended use" refers to the \objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of devices."209 Regulations further provide that intended use may be shown:
if the article is, with the knowledge of the persons or their representatives, oered and used
for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised...[I]f a manufacturer knows, or
has knowledge of facts that would give him notice that a device introduced into interstate
commerce by him is to be used for conditions, purposes, or other uses than the ones for
which he oers it, he is required to provide adequate labeling for such a device which accords
with such other uses to which the article is to be put.210
Under x205(b) of FDAMA, FDA's determination of the intended use, for purposes of determining substantial
equivalence, shall be based upon the proposed labeling submitted in the 510(k). If FDA thinks that o-label
use is likely, the Agency can require an appropriate statement in the labeling. However, FDA cannot refuse
to clear the device for marketing based on concerns about potential harms from the unlabeled use.211
FDA has issued warning letters for violations of the rule restricting promotion of unapproved uses for
approved or cleared devices. For instance, FDA sent a warning letter to a company that had a device cleared
under x 510(k) for \the local administration of ionic drug solutions into the body for medical purposes and
[for use] as an alternative to injections."212 The sponsor was promoting the device for use with a specic
drug without FDA approval of the drug for iontophoretic administration.213 An exception to the general
prohibition of unapproved/uncleared use promotion is the Investigation Device Exemption.214 FDA permits
manufacturers of Class III investigational devices to distribute \Notices of Availability of an Investigational
Device" to recruit investigators for clinical studies.215 However, the manufacturer must not state, suggest, or
20821 C.F.R. x 807.97.
20921 C.F.R. x 801.4.
211See Summary of FDAMA, supra note 11, at 61.
212See Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at 526, discussing Letter from Lilliam J. Gill, Director, Oce of
Compliance, CDRH to Empi, Inc. (Aug. 31, 1999).
213See id.
214See id. at 525.
215Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Preparing Notices of Availability of Investigational
Medical Devices and for Recruiting Study Subjects (Mar. 19, 1999).
30imply that the investigational device is safe or eective for its investigational indication.216 If a drug or device
is not labeled properly, or \misbranded," it is subject to seizure by FDA.217 Consequently, manufacturers
are prohibited from putting unapproved uses on the labeling of drugs or devices.
2. Advertising
Until 1962, the Federal Trade Commission controlled all food, drug, and cosmetic advertising. The 1962 amendments
to the FD&C Act changed that.218 Now, FDA has authority to regulate all drug labeling and prescription drug ad-
vertising. FTC, however, retains authority to regulate advertising of non-prescription drugs.219 An \advertisement"
is dened by FDA to include \advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers,
and advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone communications systems."220
While advertisements, unlike labels, may not require full disclosure, they must be balanced, cannot be misleading,
and must include core information on major side eects and contraindications. While FDA will review advertising
at the request of the company, it does not require preclearance of advertising, unlike with labeling.221
The requirements for advertising a drug or medical device are detailed in the FD&C Act. Note that there is no clear
distinction between advertising and labeling, and many advertisements will meet the denition of labeling and can be
regulated as such.222 Consequently, FDA regulates medical device advertising in various ways|either it meets the
denition of labeling, or FDA will regulate advertising for restricted devices or statements regarding the intended use
of a device. FDA does not have authority to regulate advertising for 510(k)-cleared devices unless the device has been
deemed restricted by regulation or the advertising also constitutes labeling or relates to intended use.223 Medical
device advertising must contain: the \established" name of the product in at least half the size of the trade name; a
216See id.
217See 21 U.S.C. xx 301, 331-332, 334, 352.
218See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at .
219See 21 U.S.C. x 502(n).
22021 C.F.R. x 201(1)(1)(1996).
221See Moberg, Surng the Net, supra note 208, at 216.
222See Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at |.
223See id. at 520.
31brief statement of the intended uses and warnings, precautions, side eects and contraindications; and when needed,
a description of the device's components.224 Advertisements of prescription drugs must contain: the \established"
name of the product in type at least half the size as that used for the trade or brand name; the formula showing
quantitatively each ingredient of such drug to the extent required for the labels under section 352(e); and such other
information \in brief summary" relating to side eects, contraindications, and eectiveness.225 Regulations in this
area are extensive, requiring a lengthy and detailed list of information about the advertised product in the \brief
summary" that must accompany the ad.226 In addition to these requirements, the regulations state that advertise-
ments must reect \fair balance," cannot promote unapproved uses,227 cannot omit material information so as to be
misleading, and cannot make comparative claims involving a competitor's product without \substantial" evidence
from two well-controlled trials to support the claim.228 FDA looks not only at the advertisement's actual language,
but also the \theme" and \form."229
Nevertheless, FDA has initiated changes over the past few years that have dramatically broadened the ways in which
drug manufacturers advertise pharmaceutical products directly to consumers.230 Today, pharmaceutical companies
place advertisements on television, radio, and the Internet, for the rst time directly informing patients about the
purposes, functions, and advantages of various prescription drug products.231 One author notes that, although FDA
continues to ght what it regards as abusive practices, its general tendency has been toward relaxation rather than
enhanced control.232 Despite this \relaxation" and the decision in WLF permitting manufacturers to engage in lim-
ited dissemination of information about o-label uses, the communication of unapproved uses directly to consumers
remains prohibited. An ad may not dier materially from the information in the brief summary, which in turn must
224See 21 U.S.C. x 352(r).
225See id. x 352(n).
22621 C.F.R x 202.1(e).
227See Moberg, Surng the Net, supra note 208, at 216.
228See id.
229See id.
230See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 185.
231See id. at 185.
232See id.
32conform to the product's labeling233 (i.e., no unapproved uses.
Broadcast advertisements must contain the brief summary unless \adequate provision is made for dissem-
ination of the approved or permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation."234
Practically speaking, the brief summary is essentially the same as the prescribing information required
under the labeling regulations.235 \Reminder advertisements" are exempted from the brief summary re-
quirement.236 \Reminder advertisements" are those \which call attention to the name of the drug product
but do not include indications or dosage recommendations for use of the drug product."237 They need
only contain the drug's proprietary and established name, the established name of each active ingredient,
and other optional information.238 As the discussion of current labeling and advertising law reveals, FDA
restricts manufacturer's ability to discuss and promote all potential uses of their drugs and devices. In the
current environment of encouraging increased consumer access to information and reliance on the use of
disclaimers as an alternative to broad suppression of speech, FDA may not be able to contain o-label pro-
motion. The paper evaluates promotion of unapproved uses in the context of labeling, DTC advertisements,
and the Internet. Each analysis considers arguments for the proper categorization of the speech and the
proper outcome under the relevant First Amendment doctrine.
B.
Restriction on promoting unapproved uses on the labeling of prescription drugs and medical devices
233See 21 C.F.R. x 202.1(e). See also Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at 528. After WLF, a manufacturer
may still not advertise o-label uses for previously approved products directly to the consumer. See id. at 528.
234Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate Prescription Drug Promotion, supra note 202, at 55, quoting
21 C.F.R. x 202.1(e).
235See id. at 55.
236See id., citing 21 C.F.R. x 202.1(e)(2)(i).
237See id.
238See id. at 55-56.
33The regulations which prohibit manufacturers from discussing unapproved uses of their products on labels or labeling
is a restrictive policy, which might come under attack, much as the restrictive policies regarding dissemination of
information about o-label uses in WLF. The analysis will be conducted as though drug manufacturers have sued
FDA because they want to put information about an unapproved on the label or labeling of the product. As in WLF,
FDA would likely argue that its policies are only \incidental encroachments upon speech."239 FDA has long taken
the position that the labeling of a prescription drug is fully regulable and that its controls therefore raise no First
Amendment concerns.240 For FDA, drug labeling has long constituted a separate area of speech in which extensive
regulation is permissible.241 Moreover, the Agency's interpretation nds at least tacit support from the courts. In
Kordel v. United States, the Supreme Court endorsed FDA's broad denition of drug and device labeling.242 Conse-
quently, FDA has argued that labeling occupies a \distinct category" of speech subject to a more generous analysis.243
This argument is likely to fail, however, because of the Supreme Court's decision in Liquormart. In Liquormart, the
Court rejected the notion that, where the government has extensive power to regulate, it has the authority to regulate
speech without raising First Amendment concerns.244 Just as the District Court in WLF refused to permit regula-
tion of speech merely because the federal government has extensive power to regulate the pharmaceutical industry,
a court would likely reject the argument in the context of pure labeling control as well. Polubinski concurs, noting
that, under current commercial speech jurisprudence, no such separate category of non-regulable speech exists.245
After determining that the activity at issue is speech rather than conduct, a court would need to determine whether
239WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 59.
240See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1013, citing David G. Adams, FDA
Policy on Industry-Supported Scientic and Educational Activities: Current Developments, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
629, 1414-16 (1992).
241See id. FDA has suggested that food labeling restriction receive more \limited scrutiny" than is \aorded re-
strictions on speech under extensive regulatory schemes involving areas of economic activity." See id. at 1013-14.
242See Kordel v. U.S., 333 U.S. 345 (1948).
243See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1014. See also Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 456. The Ohralik Court stated, \Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without
oending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the
exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employer's threats of retaliation for the labor
activities of employees." Id.
24444 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at ---. See also WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 60, discussing 44 Liquormart,
517 U.S. at ---.
245See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1014.
34labeling represents pure speech, entitled to full First Amendment protection, or commercial speech, entitled to more
limited protection.246 Much like the speech at issue in Bolger and Fox, the speech here has both commercial and
non-commercial components. Using the Bolger factors, a court could analyze the label and labeling and the proposed
placement of unapproved uses. Is the speech concededly an advertisement?247 Polubinski argues that labeling has
a promotional objective, particularly within the Supreme Court's conception of advertising.248 In determining the
scope of the FC&C Act's conception of labeling, the Kordel court explained: \Every labeling is in a sense an adver-
tisement."249 A product's labeling does seek to inuence physicians in their choice on which drug to prescribe.250
Consequently, although product labeling does serve an important informational public health function, it also satis-
es the rst Bolger prong because it is also partly advertising.251 Second, the speech by design refers to a specic
product.252
Finally, a court will consider the third Bolger factor: whether the speaker has an economic motivation for disseminat-
ing the speech.253 Manufacturers are motivated at least in part by economic interest. A drug or device manufacturer's
central concern is selling the product and it will fashion its label accordingly, to the extent FDA will permit.254 As
in WLF, this factor is potentially troublesome because of the dual role of the speech: it is both informational and
commercial.255 One author notes that, as with the rst factor, the analysis under the third factor is complicated by
the fact that at least some labeling does serve other functions. However, he notes that, if anything, the informational
component would indicate that pure labeling might be entitled to greater protection than commercial speech.256
246See note -- and accompanying text.
247See Bolger, 436 U.S. at |.
248See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1016.
249Kordel, 335 U.S. at 351. See also U.S. v. 24 Bottles Sterling Vinegar and Honey, Etc.,
338 F.2d 157, 159 (2
nd Cir. 1964) (holding that, in the context of promotion of ``Folk
Medicine[,]...advertising and labeling overlap; most labels advertise as well'').
250See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1016.
251See id. at 1016-1017.
252See Bolger, 436 U.S. at |. See also Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1017.
The pure labeling of prescription drugs plainly refers to a specic product. See id.
253See Bolger, 436 US.S at |.
254See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1017.
255See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at |, discussing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81.
256See Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1017.
35Plaintis opposing FDA's regulations would use that idea, arguing as did the plainti in WLF that, although the
manufacturer may have an economic motive, that is insucient without more to transform the label into commercial
speech.257 Nevertheless, as did the WLF court, a court would likely decide that the manufacturer is suciently
motivated by economic motives. A court would likely be reinforced in its decision because the speech at issue (o-
label uses on the label and labeling) is the manufacturer's own, not that of another party which the manufacturer is
disseminating. Consequently, unapproved uses on-label would be considered commercial speech.258
Next, a court would turn to the Central Hudson standard, applying the four factors as they have evolved in subse-
quent cases. The purpose here is to evaluate whether FDA's tight restrictions on valid label information restricts a
manufacturer's right to commercial speech. The rst factor evaluates whether the speech is inherently misleading
and thus outside First Amendment protection.259 If the manufacturer wishes to put unapproved uses on its labeling,
the FDA will likely argue that the speech is inherently misleading, as it did in WLF. Regulations are intended to
ensure that labeling contains accurate and complete information regarding approved use and risks.260 Whereas the
court in WLF rejected the argument that all unapproved speech is inherently misleading, a court would need to
consider the truth of the information and its ability to mislead. Unapproved uses listed on a label could be true and
veriable facts. The question is whether a potential customer could be actually misled or deceived by a label with
unapproved uses listed. The Supreme Court in Peel considered the public's ability to evaluate an attorney's listing of
certications and noted that potential legal clients can understand that licenses in general are issued by governmental
authorities, whereas a host of certicates are issued by private organizations. The Court held that the public will not
be misled by the designation of \certied."261 Will consumers similarly understand the listing of unapproved uses
on-label? It depends in large part whom one perceives the consumers (i.e., the recipients of the commercial speech)
257See WLF, 13 F.Supp.2d at 62. A plainti would want to keep the speech under the \pure speech" heading in order
to ensure full First Amendment protection.
258Cf. Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1013. Polubinski notes that under
the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence, pure labeling would likely constitute commercial speech. Id.
259See note -- about RMJ and accompanying text.
260See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 187.
261See Peel, 496 U.S. at 104.
36to be. In WLF, the recipients were clearly physicians, whom the court thought capable of evaluating information
and making informed decisions. If a court thinks that, similarly, the \consumer" here is physicians, then there will
be less of a problem. Although the ultimate goal is consumer protection, prescription drug labels today are aimed
at physicians, who act as \learned intermediaries" between manufacturers and users.262 However, if the consumer
is determined to be the public at large, we might question whether the public is likely to be deceived. Although
more than just the unapproved use would be required in the labeling (warnings, precautions, clinical pharmacology,
etc. for unapproved uses would be required in the labeling), the question remains whether the public at large can
evaluate such detailed and scientic information. In Pearson, the court rejected such an argument with respect to
health claims for dietary supplements, noting that courts have rejected a paternalistic motive on the part of the
government.263 Dietary supplements are subject to much less stringent regulation than prescription drugs, however.
A court would have to weigh the interest in the information versus the \possibilities for deception."264 The court's
decision under this factor would be a much closer call than in WLF. The decisions in WLF, Pearson, and WSMC
should signal, however, that increased consumer access to information is a legitimate right that cannot be stied
under paternalistic motives.
If a court were to decide that the speech the manufacturer wishes to place on the label were merely potentially mis-
leading, the court would proceed with the remaining Central Hudson factors.265 The plainti would argue that, at
most, the unapproved use is potentially misleading, and would rely on the Supreme Court's analysis in In re R.M.J.:
\...the state may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information...if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive."266 FDA will assert that the government's restric-
tion is reasonably related to a substantial interest.267 The asserted interest would likely revolve around public health
262See Salbu, O-Label Use, supra note 5, at 187.
263See Pearson II, 164 F.3d at |.
264In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at ---.
265``Even when a communication is not misleading, the state retains some authority to regulate.''
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
266Id. at 203.
267See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
37and safety as well as protection from economic fraud.268 If the manufacturer seeks to place unapproved uses on the
drug's label, FDA will likely oer similar arguments as it did in WLF: the government has an interest in the provision
of accurate and unbiased information to physicians (and end-consumers) as well as an incentive to get unapproved
uses formally approved.269 FDA has a stronger argument here than it did in WLF. Generally, in enduring materials,
the context of the unapproved use will be provided, e.g., the clinical trial and the complete results. Moreover, the
\speaker" is not the manufacturer per se, as in the labeling context. Although physicians are capable of critically
evaluating journal articles or textbook reprints,270 they would have a much harder time evaluating the merits of an
unapproved use advocated by the manufacturer. Manufacturers' reliance on previous cases' disdain for paternalistic
motives might not carry its argument here. As the Supreme Court noted in Edeneld, there is no question that a
state's interest in \ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial."271 Conse-
quently, a court might nd that FDA has asserted a legitimate government interest in assuring accurate and unbiased
information. As for the second asserted interest, providing an incentive to get unapproved uses formally approved,
the court would likely nd it legitimate, as the District Court did in WLF.
That the government's asserted interests are substantial in the abstract does not mean that its blanket prohibition
on unapproved uses on labels and labeling serves those interests.272 The party seeking to \uphold a restriction
on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it."273 Moreover, the government body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree.274 The regulations prohibiting the placement of unapproved uses in labeling
do directly advance both interests. By preventing drug manufacturers from including unapproved uses on a drug's
label, the manufacturer will be forced to use other routes to inform physicians of unapproved uses. These routes are
268See footnotes -- and --- and accompanying text.
269See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 69.
270See id. at 70.
271Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769.
272Cf. id. at 770.
273Bolger, 463 U.S. at 770.
274See Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 770-771, citations omitted.
38probably more conducive to complete explanations, review by others in the eld, information on clinical trials, etc.
In addition, drug manufacturers will be forced to seek FDA approval in order to get new uses on-label.275
Thus, a court will turn to an examination of the means and ends. Because commercial speech is linked inextricably
with the commercial transaction it proposes, the state's interest in regulating the underlying transaction may give
it a concomitant interest in the expression itself.276 For this reason, laws restricting commercial speech, unlike laws
burdening other forms of protected expression, need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial
state interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny.277 As the Supreme Court noted in Fox, almost all of the re-
strictions disallowed under the fourth prong of Central Hudson have been substantially excessive, disregarding \far
less restrictive and more precise means."278 FDA should be able to make a compelling argument that the regulation
meets the \reasonable t" test and is not overly broad, which was the problem in WLF. The Agency would argue
that speech about unapproved uses is not banned|manufacturers may disseminate enduring materials about such
uses, with certain restrictions; manufacturers are merely prohibited from listing unapproved uses on the labels and
labeling of drugs. As established, this directly advances a legitimate government interest. The main argument on
the other side will be that a manufacturer's speech about o-label uses has been banned. Manufacturers may only
disseminate other, independent parties' speech about unapproved uses. Moreover, manufacturers could argue that a
simple disclaimer would be far more eective. The court notes in WSMC that, if FDA were merely concerned with
protecting the public from being misled about whether a drug has been FDA-approved, the Agency could require
disclaimers.279 Disclaimers could specically state that the uses listed on the label were unapproved and had not been
subjected to FDA's drug approval process.280 Moreover, FDA could provide less drastic regulations|for example,
FDA could allow the discussion of unapproved uses in labeling where the use has been discussed and tested in an
275Cf. WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51. The WLF court found that the requirement of a supplemental application directly
advanced the goal of getting unapproved uses on-label.
276See Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 767, discussing Friedman, 440 U.S. 1 and Ohralik, 463 U.S. at 457.
277See id. at 767, citations omitted.
278Fox, 492 U.S. at 479, quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
279See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1308.
280Cf. id. See also Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 657. The court held that FDA was required to consider disclaimers as
an alternative to an outright ban on advertising. See id.
39independent clinical trial, with full disclosure of the results. This type of disclaimer would rectify FDA's concern
about information from manufacturers being biased. Moreover, the disclaimer would expose manufacturers to liability
for \o-label" use, which would provide an incentive to ensure safety. FDA could note that the manufacturers have
still missed the Agency's concerns about the incentive to get unapproved uses on-label. Without the restrictions
on promoting unapproved uses in labeling, manufacturers would have no incentive to go through the FDA approval
process more than once for a particular drug or device.
A court could easily come out on either side. A court could conclude that FDA's means and ends are much more
reasonable than in WLF, Pearson, or WSMC and that FDA's policy of disallowing unapproved uses on the labeling
of prescription drugs and medical devices passes constitutional muster.281 Or a court could be swayed by the policy
of increased consumer access to information. Finding the promotion via labeling a constitutional right, a court could
encourage FDA to soften the requirements for obtaining approval of unapproved uses or to provide an incentive to
manufacturers such as an increase in the patent (monopoly).
C. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of O-Label Uses
In this era of increased access to information, FDA must guard against unduly restricting commercial speech,
including direct-to-consumer (DTC) o-label advertising via television, radio, and print media. The speech
would easily pass the threshold question of whether it is \commercial" because the commercial aspect over-
whelms the non-commercial. Under the Bolger factors, DTC advertisements are concededly advertisements,
281Cf. Polubinski, Closing the Channels of Communication, supra note 25, at 1022. \It remains likely that a court
would uphold the current regulatory scheme regardless of the test it uses." Id. Stevens' plurality opinion in Liquormart
explains that when a regulation intends to \protect consumers from misleading, deceptive or aggressive sales practices,
or require disclosure of benecial consumer information, [its] purpose...is consistent with the reasons for according
constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justies less than strict review. See 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. at |.
40clearly refer to a specic product, and are the result of an economic motivation on the part of the drug or
device manufacturer.282 Consequently, a court would proceed to evaluate the regulations prohibiting DTC
o-label advertising under the Central Hudson standard.
The toughest question for a court would be whether the advertisements regarding o-label use contain lan-
guage that is false or misleading. FDA's strongest argument might be that the speech is inherently misleading
because of the potential for abuse, given the speaker and the audience. Unlike with the enduring materials
in WLF, the manufacturer would be disseminating its own speech, rather than that of others. Courts have
recognized that information on o-label uses is not inherently misleading when aimed at physicians,283 but
no court has similarly concluded that for the general public. In Pearson, the D.C. Circuit rejected the notion
that the proposed health claims were inherently misleading merely because FDA had not approved them,
thus foreclosing that argument for FDA in the realm of dietary supplements.284 Moreover, the Pearson court
found that consumers are capable of discriminating among various health claims, noting that, \It would be as
if the consumers were asked to buy something while hypnotized, and therefore they are bound to be misled.
We think this contention is almost frivolous."285 However, the situation is not completely analogous to the
dietary supplement context. Consumers are potentially less savvy with respect to prescription drugs and
medical devices than with respect to dietary supplements. Even if that is the case, however, physicians can
act as lters. Still, the information must not be inaccurate with respect to end-consumers. In Liquormart,
the Supreme Court noted that \the law has developed to ensure that advertising provides consumers with
accurate information about the availability of goods and services."286
To evaluate whether the speech is inherently misleading the WSMC court noted its considerations: (1)
whether the speech is more likely to deceive than to inform the public; (2) whether there is a substantial
282See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
283See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at |.
284See Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 655.
285Id. at 655.
28644 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496.
41possibility for deception; (3) whether the type of advertising at issue is subject to abuse; and (4) whether
the intended audience has the ability to evaluate the claims made.287 The o-label use information is pre-
sumably truthful. Moreover, the misleading element might be reduced or removed altogether by the use of
a narrower restriction.288 There remains the question of whether the problem can be solved by a disclaimer.
The Supreme Court in In re R.M.J. made clear that if the information may be presented in a way that is
not deceptive, potentially misleading information may not be prohibited by the government.289 At most,
the commercial speech appears to be potentially misleading. Therefore, a court would need to evaluate the
restrictions on o-label DTC advertising under the remaining Central Hudson factors.
FDA would likely point to the general goal of protecting health and safety as the substantial government
interest, similar to its arguments in WLF, Pearson, and WSMC. A court would have to agree that such
a goal meets the substantial governmental interest requirement. In Rubin, the Supreme Court stated that
\the Government has a signicant interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens."290
There are few, if any, more important functions performed by any regulatory agency than the function in
this hypothetical|that of ensuring, when a citizen takes a prescription drug or uses a medical device, that
the individual has absolute assurance that the product is safe and eective for the condition for which her
physician prescribed it.291 FDA would probably assert additional interests as well, such as providing en-
couragement for manufacturers to get o-label uses approved. FDA approval gives consumers important
information to evaluate a particular drug. The court in WLF concluded that encouraging manufacturers to
subject o-label uses to the drug approval process is a substantial governmental interest.292 Congress has
determined that mandatory FDA approval of all drug uses benets the public health, and absent a showing
287See WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at |-, citations omitted.
288See id. at 1300.
289See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
290Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485.
291Cf. WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 69.
292See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 71 and WLF II, 56 F.Supp.2d at 85.
42of unsupportable paternalism or some other essential aw, a court will likely accept Congress' judgment on
the matter.293 Consequently, a court would likely conclude that encouraging FDA approval is a legitimate
goal. FDA might also assert an interest in assuring that consumers receive accurate and unbiased informa-
tion in order to prevent consumer fraud. As the Supreme Court noted in Edeneld, the government has a
substantial interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace.294 Moreover,
the court in Pearson noted that the \government's interest in preventing consumer fraud/confusion may
well take on added importance in the context of a product, such as dietary supplements, that can aect
the public's health."295 This is a dierent inquiry than in WLF, where the court focused on the physician's
ability to evaluate eectively o-label information in the form of enduring materials or CME seminars,296
and determined that ensuring accurate information was not a legitimate interest. Thus, the government
would probably succeed in its argument that limiting consumer fraud by ensuring accurate information is a
legitimate substantial interest.
Having satised the second factor, the prohibition on o-label DTC advertisements will be evaluated under
the third Central Hudson factor: does the regulation directly advance the governmental interests asserted?297
FDA will carry the burden of justifying its restriction by demonstrating that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.298 FDA will need to show that
the prohibition on o-label DTC advertisements will avert the following harms: the deception of the public
that FDA has approved the discussed uses and the absence of an incentive to get o-label uses on-label.
A court is likely to nd that the restriction on o-label DTC advertisements does not directly advance
the government's interest in preventing the deception of the public because disclaimers, which would not
293Cf. WLF II, 56 F.Supp.2d at 86.
294See Edeneld, 507 U.S. at |.
295Pearson II, 164 F.3d at 656.
296See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51 & WLF II, 36 F.Supp.2d 16. \The government, however benign its motivations,
simply cannot justify a restriction of truthful nonmisleading speech on the paternalistic assumption that such restriction
is necessary to protect the listener from ignorantly or inadvertently misuing the information." 13 F.Supp.2d at 69-70.
297See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
298See Edeneld, 507 U.S. at 770-771.
43suppress speech, could more easily accomplish FDA's goal. Any potential deception of the public of this
kind can be dealt with through a disclaimer, much as was suggested in WLF and Pearson. A court would
probably nd that the prohibition does directly advance the goal of FDA approval, however, relying on the
WLF court's discussion regarding the supplemental application. Thus, the regulation directly advances one
of the government's substantial interests.
Finally, a court will examine the t between the government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends. Restrictions designed to prevent deceptive advertising must be narrowly drawn and no more
extensive than necessary to further substantial interests.299 In WLF, the court found that the supplemental
application requirement was not suciently narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate goal of encouraging
manufacturers to get o-label uses approved.300 However, the WLF court noted that one of the factors
in making its decision that the regulation was overly broad was that manufacturers are still much more
limited in their promotion of o-label uses and that, therefore, FDA should not engage in \constitutional
blackmail."301 If courts take away all impediments to o-label promotion, FDA may have no tool to use
to encourage manufacturers to get new uses approved. Therefore, a court might be willing to nd the
means/end t reasonable with respect to the goal of getting o-label uses on-label. Moreover, the policy
in favor of increased disclosure in product labeling may not similarly motivate a court with regard to DTC
advertisements. DTC advertisements, particularly broadcast ones, do not provide a forum for full disclosure.
Perhaps FDA might be able to argue that even in an era favoring increased consumer access to information,
short-form ads are not the method with which to do it.
D. Internet and O-label Uses
299See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.
300See WLF II, 56 F.Supp.2d at 87.
301See id.
441. Background
As noted, FDA strives to assure the safety and integrity of food, drugs, and cosmetics. To that end, the law
has continually developed to respond to new fraudulent and dangerous medical claims. The Internet provides
unprecedented opportunities to exchange information|for medical device and pharmaceutical companies as
well as consumers and medical practitioners.302 Consequently, FDA's intention to develop a regulatory
scheme for Internet drug promotion was unsurprising.303 Uncontrolled drug promotion on the Internet is
a relatively recent problem.304 Nevertheless, surveys indicate that disease information is already the most
sought-out category of information on the Internet, and market researchers predict that the Internet will
become the single greatest source of health care information within the next ve years.305
One of the rst issues for FDA will be to determine whether promotion on the Internet falls under \la-
beling" or \advertising." In 1996, the Director of CDRH's Promotion and Advertising Policy Sta noted
that device information on the Internet likely constituted labeling. In his view, materials on the Internet
are not \any dierent from promotional literature sent directly to consumers."306 One commentator agrees,
arguing that Internet materials should be considered labeling rather than advertising because written mate-
302See Moberg, Surng the Net, supra note 208, at 213.
303See Leah Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion on the Internet, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 599 (1999), citing
F-D-C- REP., Internet Advertising; Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical Products on the Internet, Notice of Public
Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,707 (Dept. 16, 1996). A panelist at a 1996 FDA Conference of Drug Promotion on the
Internet stated, \There is some frank quackery going on out there." Id.
304The Internet is a child of the cold war. In the 1960s, Paul Baran of the Rand Corporation,
a military think tank, conceived a ``fishnet'' information infrastructure that could survive a
nuclear attack. See Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate Prescription Drug Promotion, supra note
202, at 47-48. Building on that idea, the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project
Association created ARPANET, a small network that linked supercomputers located at several
universities in the United States in 1969. See id. The commercial version, TELENET, was opened
in 1974, making fast e-mail communication available to nonacademics. In 1990, ARPANET was
decommissioned, leaving only the networks connected by a data transfer protocol called ``TCP/IP.''
The Internet had a momentous year in 1991. Initially, the principal backbone of the Internet was
a network maintained by the National Science Foundation called NSFNET. Although it at first banned
any commercial traffic, that ban was lifted in 1991. See id. at 48.
305See Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion, supra note 304, at 602.
306See Device Information on the Internet Likely Constitutes Labeling, M-D-D-I REP. (\The Gray Sheet"), July
15, 1996 at I and W, 5-6. See also FDA Must Address Internet Advertising, Former Agency Commissioner Hayes
Suggests, F-D-C REP. (\The Pink Sheet"), Oct. 23, 1995.
45rials on the Internet can be far more expansive than typical advertisements in journals and newspapers.307
However, CDRH has taken the position that product claims on-line, other than those on manufacturers'
homepages, are advertising and will be so regulated.308 Other commentators have argued that, because the
Internet depends on \telephone communications systems," FDA has little choice but to classify all informa-
tion broadcast across the Internet as \advertisements."309 If this is the case, FDA will have authority to
regulate only promotions of prescription drugs and restricted medical devices, leaving over-the-counter drug
promotions to the FTC.310
The Internet presents novel issues that FDA's regulations and guidance originally did not contemplate. FDA
has not issued any formal guidance that addresses specically the novel promotional issues presented by in-
creasing use of the Internet. While FDA is developing a formal policy with respect to promotion on the
Internet, companies have been advised to \ask themselves whether the information they seek to post would
be permissible on `hard copy."'311 Currently, FDA initiates enforcement actions against specic Internet
promotions it considers false and misleading. Usually, FDA targets websites promoting products without
clearance, o-label uses, or otherwise employing misleading or unsupported claims. For example, FDA sent
a warning letter to a manufacturer of a uterine balloon therapy system promoted on the manufacturer's
homepage for use in the treatment of menorrhagia.312 FDA had not cleared the device for menorrhagia;
consequently, the Agency declared that such promotion rendered the device adulterated under the FD&C
Act.313 FDA has reacted similarly to links on manufacturer homepages to sites discussing o-label use.
FDA has issued a warning letter to a manufacturer of a transurethral injection needle system and injec-
307See Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview of Likely FDA Regulation of Internet Promotion, 51 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 697 (1996).
308See Moberg, Surng the Net, supra note 208, at 219.
309Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion, supra note 304, at 603. The definition for advertising
includes ``telephone communications systems.'' 21 C.F.R. x 201(1)(1)(1996).
310See 21 U.S.C. x 502(n).
311Moberg, Surfing the Net, supra note 208, at 219, citations omitted.
312See, Director, Oce of Compliance, CDRH to Gynecare, Inc. (Feb. 5, 1997).
313See id.
46tion/aspiration needle device concerning the links provided on its website.314 FDA stated that the material
presented on the website modied the manufacturer's intended use for the product and resulted in the mis-
branding and adulteration of both devices.315 FDA specically pointed out a link on the website to an article
which included a statement that \the delivery of adenoviral vectors directly to the prostate provided the
`best route to treat local prostate cancer by viral-based gene therapy."'316 Although there was no explicit
reference to the manufacturer's products in the article, FDA concluded that the implication created by the
link along with a picture of the device after the article was sucient to result in the misbranding of the
devices.317 Consumer groups, medical associations, and even some drug producers have called on FDA to
develop a comprehensive regulatory approach.318
2. First Amendment Analysis
Aside from the practical diculties of FDA's regulating promotion of o-label uses on the Internet, the
Agency may face constitutional impediments as well.319 Because many cases have held that more informa-
tion is preferable to less, FDA may not be able to stie commercial speech about unapproved uses. Whether
FDA may constitutionally restrict o-label promotion on the Internet will turn on an analysis of what type
of speech is at issue and an evaluation of the restriction under the appropriate standard. Much of the
analysis will turn on the speaker's identity. FDA may not restrict the discussion of unapproved uses by
non-manufacturers, nor does the Agency restrict the prescription of drugs and medical devices for unap-
proved uses; moreover, the Agency may not prevent a manufacturer from disseminating enduring materials
that discuss o-label use to certain groups. If FDA were to prevent the discussion of o-label uses by non-
314See Basile, Medical Device, supra note 198, at 531, discussing Letter to Gynecare.
315See id.
316See id.
317See id.
318See Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion, supra note 304, at 602.
319For a good discussion of the practical difficulties of regulating promotion on the Internet, see
Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion, supra note 304, at ---.
47manufacturers, an analysis would likely determine that the speech deserved full First Amendment protection.
Consequently, FDA will need to construct its regulations to avoid an overly broad suppression of speech.
Given the warning letters FDA has sent to manufacturers, it appears that the Agency plans to prohibit not
only the discussion by the manufacturer of o-label uses, but also the reference to sites which discuss such
uses. This paper analyzes such restrictions under the First Amendment.
As the discussion above indicates, the speech is a hybrid of \labeling" and \advertising," with both com-
mercial and non-commercial aspects. Much as the Supreme Court did in Bolger and Fox, a court would
need to evaluate the speech and would likely conclude that speech directly on a manufacturer's homepage
should be categorized as commercial speech. The economic motive of the speaker is clear and there will be
at least a tacit, if not explicit, reference to a specic product. These two factors would probably outweigh
the argument that the speech is not concededly an advertisement, but perhaps a scientic discussion of the
merits of an approved drug for unapproved uses. Once under the commercial speech designation, a court
would consider the four factors of Central Hudson. The analysis of the links would be analogous to that of
the enduring materials in WLF, with the exception of the recipients' identity. A court would likely conclude
that the manufacturers endeavor through the links to increase the sales volume of their drugs, and that the
speech is commercial in nature.320 A strong argument can be made, nonetheless, that the speech is \pure"
and thus entitled to full First Amendment protection: the linked sites are not necessarily advertisements, do
not necessarily mention the product name, and consumers who invoke their right to receive the information
may have no economic motivation at all.321
Is the speech targeted by the prohibition constitutionally protected?322 It is unlikely that FDA can make
a viable argument that the speech is not constitutionally protected because it is misleading. Under Central
320Cf. WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d at 64.
321For a similar argument in the context of enduring materials, see Murphy, ``It's Time to Make a
Good Agency Better,'' supra note 9, at 621.
322See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
48Hudson, \for commercial speech to come within [First Amendment protection], it must at least concern law-
ful activity and not be misleading."323 The speech about o-label uses concerns lawful activity because FDA
does not prohibit the prescription or use of a drug or device for non-approved purposes. Moreover, FDA
has consistently failed to demonstrate that speech about o-label use is inherently misleading. In evaluating
whether the speech is misleading, a court will consider whether the speech is \more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it."324 As for the information on a manufacturer's homepage, the fact that the manu-
facturer is the speaker might cause confusion that the use is FDA-approved, but this can easily be resolved
through disclaimers, as in Pearson. With respect to links to sites that discuss o-label use, a court would
likely rely on the analysis in WLF to conclude that the speech is not likely to deceive the public. Only when
a manufacturer initiates the exchange of information through the use of a link does FDA choose to label
the speech false or inherently misleading. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this situation, noting,
\Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial speech cases, decisions that select
among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles undergird-
ing the First Amendment."325 Consequently, a court should conclude the speech provided via the links at
issue is not inherently misleading. The next questions a court would consider in evaluating the \inherently
misleading" nature of the speech, as advanced by FDA, are whether there are substantial \possibilities for
deception"326 and \whether experience has shown that such advertising is subject to abuse."327 Analysis of
the discussion of unapproved uses on the manufacturer's website would be similar to that of listing unap-
proved uses in labeling (primarily because FDA would currently regulate such information as \labeling").
With respect to links to sites discussing o-label use, it is quite analogous to WLF and the dissemination
323Id.
324Id. at 563.
325Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. U.S., --- U.S. ---; 119 SCt. 1923, 1935 (1999).
326Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13.
327In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
49of enduring materials.328 While FDA might be able to require that the linked pages meet the same require-
ments as the enduring materials under FDAMA, the Agency could likely not ban listing links as inherently
misleading. Finally, a court would consider whether the intended audience has the ability to evaluate the
claims made.329 FDA's strongest argument will be similar to that under DTC advertising of o-label uses.
Although most information on the Internet is written for medical practitioners, everyone has access to the
information.330 Nevertheless, broad access alone should not cause the speech to be inherently misleading
and outside First Amendment protection altogether. Thus, the court will proceed with the remainder of the
Central Hudson factors.
Second, a court will consider whether the government asserts a substantial interest in prohibiting o-label
discussion and links on manufacturer homepages.331 FDA can point to the general goal of protecting the
public health and safety without challenge.332 More specic goals FDA might assert include those asserted
previously with respect to putting unapproved uses in labeling and disseminating enduring materials dis-
cussing o-label uses. In WLF, FDA asserted an interest in the accuracy of information and the incentive
to get unapproved uses approved by the Agency. In Pearson, FDA advanced an interest in preventing the
confusion of consumers. The WLF and the Pearson courts rejected the interests in accurate information
and prevention of confusion as overly paternalistic. As in the labeling context, however, a court could easily
determine that ensuring accurate information is a legitimate goal, especially in the context of the Internet,
where information and its source can be questionable. A court would likely conclude much as in Pearson
and the DTC advertising context that the prevention of consumer confusion is not a legitimate goal. A
disclaimer would resolve FDA's concern. The interest in the approval of unapproved uses continues to be
the most persuasive, and a court would likely agree with the WLF decision that encouraging FDA approval
328See WLF I, 13 F.Supp.2d 51 and WLF III, 56 F.Supp.2d 81.
329See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
330See Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion, supra note 304, at |.
331See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at |.
332See, e.g., Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485, and WSMC, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1301.
50is a legitimate goal.
Under the third Central Hudson factor, a court will consider whether the two substantial governmental
interests are directly advanced by the prohibition of o-label discussion or links to sites with o-label dis-
cussion on manufacturers' homepages. The prohibition does not advance the goal of ensuring accurate and
unbiased information, because more disclosures rather than less would best serve this goal. Much as in the
labeling and DTC advertising contexts, however, the goal of encouraging formal approval of unapproved uses
does seem advanced by the broad prohibition. Nevertheless, the prohibition on providing informative links
fails the ends and means test because it is not \reasonable" and results in a broad suppression of speech.
Consequently, FDA can probably continue to suppress manufacturer's own speech about o-label uses on
Internet homepages, but not the provision of materials similar to the enduring materials in WLF.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, FDA may continue to suppress some forms of discussion about o-label use, primarily where
there is little opportunity to evaluate the information and no independent research is included (such as in
short Direct-to-Consumer advertisements and possibly on homepages). As the ability to access information
continues to grow, however, FDA will probably be forced to allow the increased promotion of unapproved
uses.
51